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Abstract 
We investigated the interactive roles of procedural justice of the tax authority, trust in the tax 
authority, and identification with the nation in predicting voluntary tax compliance. Drawing 
from fairness heuristic theory and relational models of justice, we predicted that the relationship 
between procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance that has been found particularly among 
citizens with low (vs. high) trust in the tax authorities is restricted to citizens who weakly (vs. 
strongly) identify with the nation. The results of a field study with samples of Ethiopian and US 
taxpayers as respondents largely support our predictions. This research integrates the role of 
important and well-studied social psychological factors that shape voluntary tax compliance and 
reveals support for the hypothesis in a developing (i.e., Ethiopia) and a developed (i.e., US) 
nation – nations with strongly divergent tax climates.  
Keywords: procedural justice, cognition-based trust, identification with the nation, 
voluntary tax compliance 
PsycINFO classification code: 3040 
JEL classification code: H26 
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1. Introduction 
Tax revenue constitutes the lion’s share of funds governments use to finance public expenditure. 
For tax revenue to yield the maximum possible benefit to the public, it must be collected in an 
efficient way – spending as little of the tax revenue as possible in collection costs (Bird & Zolt, 
2008; Serra, 2003; Slemrod, 1990). In order for tax collection to be efficient, authorities need to 
secure taxpayers’ voluntary compliance with tax laws (Alm, Kirchler, & Muehlbacher, 2012). 
Securing voluntary tax compliance is much more efficient than relying on enforced compliance 
(i.e., threatening citizens with punishment upon tax non-compliance), as this latter option is very 
costly, if it can be achieved at all (Alm, Kirchler, Muehlbacher, Gangl, Hofmann, Kogler, & 
Pollai, 2012; Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008). One of the most important tools that tax 
authorities have at their disposal to promote voluntary tax compliance is to ensure that citizens 
perceive decision-making procedures related to tax collection as fair (Farrar, 2015; Hartner, 
Rechberger, Kirchler, & Schabmann, 2008; Murphy & Tyler, 2008).  
Unfortunately, our understanding of when and why such fairness perceptions (i.e., the 
procedural justice of tax authorities) promote voluntary tax compliance is severely limited for 
three reasons. First, prior work addressing this relationship has not always revealed consistent 
results. Some studies revealed that high procedural justice promotes voluntary tax compliance 
(e.g., Alm, Jackson, & McKee, 1993; Farrar, 2015; Murphy, 2004; Murphy & Tyler, 2008); yet 
other studies did not reveal such an effect (e.g., Porcano, 1988; Worsham, 1996) or found it on 
some indices of tax compliance but not on others (Wenzel, 2002). Second, our understanding of 
the processes that may explain the positive effect of procedural justice on voluntary tax 
compliance is incomplete. Some scholars focused on the role of taxpayers’ trust in the tax 
authority in this process, noting that high procedural justice communicates the information that 
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authorities can be trusted not to abuse their power, which makes citizens more willing to contribute 
to the collective by voluntarily paying their taxes (Murphy, 2004; van Dijke & Verboon, 2010). 
Yet other researchers linked the effect of procedural justice on voluntary (tax) compliance with 
citizens’ identification with the nation (e.g., Hartner-Tiefenthaler, Rechberger, & Kirchler, 2013; 
Hartner, Kirchler, Poschalko, & Rechberger, 2010; Wenzel, 2002). Unfortunately, it is as yet 
unclear how trust and identification processes may relate to one another to explain the relationship 
between procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance. 
Third, virtually all studies so far on the relationship between procedural justice and tax 
compliance have been conducted in developed nations in Europe, Australia, and the US (see 
Gobena & van Dijke, 2016 for an exception). This reflects the more general trend in the tax 
compliance literature that almost all research addressing antecedents of tax compliance has been 
conducted in developed nations (see Doyle, Gallery, Coyle, & Commissioners, 2009; Palil, 2010, 
for reviews; for exceptions, see Abdul-Razak & Adafula, 2013; Smulders & Naidoo, 2013). This 
is problematic because the tax environment in developing countries differs strongly from that in 
developed countries. For instance, in contrast to the situation in developed countries, in 
developing countries taxpayers and tax authorities often show less mutual understanding. Tax 
authorities in these countries tend to be less sympathetic of taxpayers’ difficulties; taxpayers on 
their part feel persecuted by those authorities and are more likely to evade taxes when they see 
an opportunity to do so (Fjeldstad, 2001; Gangl, Hofmann, & Kirchler, 2015).  
In the present paper, we address these three limitations to our understanding of the 
relationship between the procedural justice of the tax authority and citizens’ voluntary tax 
compliance. Specifically, to understand when procedural justice may predict voluntary tax 
compliance and when this will not be the case, we take a moderator approach and thus focus on 
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identifying critical boundary conditions to this effect (Vancouver & Carlson, 2015). As moderator 
variables, we simultaneously consider trust in the tax authority and identification with the nation. 
Integrating arguments from fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001) and relational models of 
procedural justice (Blader & Tyler, 2015), we argue that the relationship between procedural 
justice and voluntary tax compliance is most pronounced among citizens with low (vs. high) trust 
in the tax authorities who at the same time weakly (vs. strongly) identify with their nation. 
We test this proposed three-way interaction effect of procedural justice, trust in the tax 
authority, and identification with the nation on voluntary tax compliance among taxpayers in a 
developing country (Ethiopia) and in a developed country (the US). The tax environment in 
Ethiopia constitutes a typical “cops and robbers” type of climate, whereby the tax authority holds 
the belief that all taxpayers strive to evade taxes whenever situations allow them and taxpayers 
reciprocate by hiding their genuine income and taxable transactions from tax officials (Bekana, 
Gobena, & Yibrah, 2014; Debere, 2014; Gobena & van Dijke, 2016; Yesegat & Fjeldstad, 2016). 
The tax environment in the US is a more advanced setting in which the interaction between the 
tax authority and the taxpayers is undeniably smoother than that in developing countries (Alm, 
2012; Alm et al., 1993; Alm, McClelland, & Schulze, 1999). Though we do not claim that 
Ethiopia and the US are representatives, respectively, of developing and developed economies, 
they are examples of such economies, and finding support for our prediction in both of these 
distinct tax environments arguably boosts the ecological validity of our conclusions. Evidence of 
the countries’ distinct taxation climates is found in the size of the shadow economy as a 
percentage of GDP, which is cited as a proxy for citizens’ tax morale (Torgler & Schneider, 
2007). This percentage averages 45% for developing countries and was estimated at 35.1% for 
Ethiopia in 2007;  it averages 19% for member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-
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operation and Development (OECD) (Schneider & Enste, 2013) and was estimated at 8.4% for 
the US in 2015 (Schneider, 2015). 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis  
2.1 Procedural Justice and Voluntary Tax Compliance 
Procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of the decision-making procedures that 
authorities follow to arrive at resource allocation decisions (Leventhal, 1980). It is shaped by a 
multitude of factors, such as the consistent application of procedures over time and across all 
affected, the use of accurate information for decision-making, decisions being free from 
decision-makers’ self-interest, and allowing those affected to voice their opinion in the 
authority’s decisions (Colquitt, 2001; Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Walker, 1989). 
Procedural justice leads to positive attitudes and cooperative responses among members of social 
collectives in a variety of settings, such as law enforcement (Barkworth & Murphy, 2015), work 
relations (e.g., Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000), and educational settings (e.g., Ereş, 
Gülcan, & Çelik, 2014). As noted, procedural justice has also been shown to predict voluntary 
compliance with tax laws (Farrar, 2015; Hartner et al., 2008; Murphy & Tyler, 2008), although 
this relationship has not always been found (e.g., Porcano, 1988; Wenzel, 2002; Worsham, 
1996). 
An influential theory that explains why procedural justice promotes voluntary tax 
compliance is fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001). This theory notes that investing in a 
collective (such as by voluntarily paying one’s taxes) confers a sense of identity and belonging, 
along with opportunities for improved outcomes (e.g., a better functioning country) but also 
possible exploitation when authorities abuse or reject citizens. Individuals respond positively 
(e.g., with elevated tax compliance) to high procedural justice because it informs them that 
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authorities can be trusted not to abuse their power (Lind, 2001; van Dijk, Parks, & van Lange, 
2013). Trust is defined as the “willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based 
on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 
1995, p. 712).  
Prior studies have tested predictions derived from fairness heuristic theory in the area of 
tax compliance. Gobena and van Dijke (2016) predicted and found that the relationship between 
procedural justice and tax compliance should be pronounced particularly when the tax authority 
is perceived as having high (rather than low) coercive power or low (rather than high) legitimate 
power because the possibility of exploitation should be particularly salient in these situations. 
Moreover, they also found that the relationship between procedural justice and tax compliance, 
as moderated by legitimate power, was mediated by trust in the authority, thus suggesting that 
procedural justice is considered informative of the tax authority’s trustworthiness (see also, e.g., 
Murphy, 2004; Yang, Mossholder, & Peng, 2009, for other research showing that the 
relationship between procedural justice and cooperative responses is mediated by trust in the 
authority). Other work provided evidence for fairness heuristic theory by zooming in on the role 
of trust in the authority as a moderator of the effect of procedural justice on tax compliance. Van 
Dijke and Verboon (2010) showed that citizens with low (vs. high) trust in the tax authority – 
and who thus particularly fear exploitation by the authority – respond more strongly with tax 
compliance to procedural justice information (see also De Cremer & Tyler, 2007; van den Bos, 
Wilke, & Lind, 1998, for other work that considered trust as a moderator of procedural justice 
effects). 
The effects of procedural justice on compliance with authorities have also been explained 
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in terms of identification with the nation. Identification with the nation is defined as the “belief 
in a shared culture, history, traditions, symbols, kinship, language, religion, territory, founding 
moments, and destiny” (Guibernau, 2004, p. 134). Identification with the nation stimulates 
commitment to the welfare of the nation through internalization of the collective benefits 
(Wenzel & Jobling, 2006), and this enhances voluntary cooperation (van Dijk, De Cremer, & 
Handgraaf, 2004; Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Schatz & Lavine, 2007), including payment of one’s 
taxes as they come due (Wenzel, 2007). The group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and the 
relational model of cooperation (Tyler & Blader, 2003) assert that people consider fair decision-
making by authorities representing the collective as identity information; being treated fairly tells 
people that they are respected members, whereas unfair treatment tells them that they are less 
valued, less respected members (Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Blader, 2000).  
In support of these models, some studies show that the identity information that is 
communicated by decision-making procedures is most impactful among group members caring 
most about the group. For instance, people who are strongly committed to an organization react 
more strongly to perceived fairness than less committed organization members (Brockner, Tyler, 
& Cooper-Schneider, 1992). Moreover, the support for procedurally fair, rather than unfair, 
authorities is more pronounced among people who strongly identify with the relevant collective 
(Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996; Tyler & Degoey, 1995), and the effect of procedural justice on 
self-perceived respect is restricted to people who identify strongly with the relevant collective 
(van Dijke & De Cremer, 2008). Within the tax compliance literature, procedural justice has also 
been shown to be particularly effective in promoting tax compliance among citizens who 
strongly identify with their country (Wenzel, 2002). 
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2.2 Integrating the Roles of Trust and Identification 
As noted, the extant literature documents trust as both a mediator (e.g., Murphy, 2004; Yang, 
Mossholder, & Peng, 2009) and a moderator (e.g., De Cremer & Tyler, 2007; van Dijke & 
Verboon, 2010) of the relationship between procedural justice and cooperative responses such as 
voluntary compliance with authorities. The present research extends work that has viewed trust 
as a moderator of procedural justice effects on cooperative responses. From the perspective of 
fairness heuristic theory, trust is relevant to consider as a moderator of procedural justice effects, 
as low trust in an authority implies fear of exploitation. This makes individuals focus more 
strongly on procedural justice (as an indicator of authority integrity), consequentially making 
procedural justice effects stronger (van Dijke & Verboon, 2010). In the present paper we argue 
that this Procedural Justice × Trust interaction on voluntary tax compliance is further moderated 
by citizens’ level of identification with the nation. Specifically, we argue that the fear of being 
taken advantage of (as implied by low trust) may be less relevant to individuals who identify 
strongly with the collective. We expect this because such individuals have internalized collective 
goals and want to support the collective, irrespective of the costs to themselves and their personal 
gains (De Cremer, 2005; van Lange, 1999). Among citizens who strongly identify with the 
nation, low trust should be less likely to strengthen the effect of procedural justice on voluntary 
compliance, as high identifiers care less about their own interests (De Cremer, 2005; Hegtvedt, 
Ganem, Waldron, & Brody, 2009; Frey & Meier, 2004). These arguments culminate in our 
hypothesis: 
Identification with the nation moderates the interaction effect of procedural justice of the 
tax authorities and trust in these authorities on voluntary tax compliance, such that procedural 
justice is positively related with voluntary tax compliance primarily when trust is low (vs. high) 
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and, simultaneously, identification is low (vs. high). 
3. Study Overview 
As noted, we tested our hypothesis in a sample of Ethiopian working professionals and a sample 
of US working professionals. We conducted a cross-sectional survey in which we measured our 
predictor variables – procedural justice, trust, and identification with the nation – as well as the 
criterion variable – voluntary tax compliance – at a single point in time. To establish the 
discriminant validity of our findings, we also included enforced tax compliance as a criterion 
variable (in addition to voluntary tax compliance). We did this because procedural justice and 
trust both overlap somewhat with the perceived competence of the tax authority in collecting 
taxes (e.g., by increasing perceived detection probability; see Gangl et al., 2015; Gangl, 
Hofmann, Pollai, & Kirchler, 2012; Kirchler et al., 2008; Weiner, Graham, & Reyna, 1997). 
Perceptions of competence can be associated with higher levels of enforced tax compliance 
(Devos, 2014; Hartl, Hofmann, Gangl, Hartner-Tiefenthaler, & Kirchler, 2015; Hofmann, Gangl, 
Kirchler, & Stark, 2014). However, our argument about the role of identification with the nation 
in moderating the Procedural Justice × Trust interaction assumes that identification makes 
individuals voluntarily contribute to the collective, regardless of the cost for themselves. 
Therefore, finding that the hypothesized three-way interaction between procedural justice, trust 
in the tax authority, and identification predicts voluntary, rather than enforced, tax compliance 
will boost our confidence in the conclusions that we draw.  
4. Method  
4.1 Respondents and procedure 
We determined the appropriate size of our samples with power analysis using the G*Power 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Power analysis is used to calculate the minimum 
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sample size required so that one is reasonably likely to detect an effect of a given size (Abraham 
& Russell, 2008). Interaction effects are usually small in size in survey designs (in terms of 
Cohen’s (1988) rules of thumb, f2 = .03-.04; Aguinis, Beaty, Boik, & Pierce, 2005; Shieh, 2010). 
With a desired power of .80 (i.e., an 80% probability of detecting a true effect with effect size of 
.035), β = .20, and α = .05 (i.e., a 5% chance of incorrectly concluding an effect exists in the 
population when it does not), power analysis yielded a minimum sample size of 179. Our sample 
sizes (N = 217 for the Ethiopian sample and N = 200 for the US) are thus appropriate to draw 
reliable conclusions. 
In the Ethiopian Civil Service University, Tilburg University, and Erasmus University, 
with which we are affiliated, a researcher is not required to obtain ethics approval for data 
collection using surveys for which responding is highly unlikely to affect the psychological or 
physical well-being of respondents. Furthermore, filling in our survey was based on voluntary 
participation, indicated in a letter accompanying the questionnaire (Ethiopian sample) or 
communicated in the recruitment message (US sample), and hence we did not seek ethics 
approval. 
The first sample consisted of 217 working professionals (i.e., taxpayers who were engaged 
primarily in business consulting activities with accounting, economics, management, and 
engineering backgrounds; some engaged in tertiary-level teaching; and only a few with a lower 
level of academics working as clerks and secretaries) in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. We 
administered a questionnaire prepared in English. Of the respondents, 83.6% were male, 14.2% 
were female, and 2.2% did not indicate their gender. Respondents were between 20 and 60 years of 
age (Mage = 36.3, SDage = 8.04). With regard to the highest level of education, 0.5% had completed 
elementary education only, 4.1% had a 2-year college diploma, 20.1% had a bachelor’s degree, 
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60.3% had completed a master’s degree, 11.9% had completed a PhD, and 3.1% did not indicate 
their highest level of education. With respect to their annual earnings, 7.1% of the respondents 
reported that they had annual earnings of 20,000–40,000 Ethiopian Birr (1 Birr = approximately 
USD .05), 11.8% had earned 40,000–60,000 Birr, 16.6% had earned 60,000–80,000 Birr, 29.9% 
had earned 80,000–100,000 Birr, 10.9% had earned 100,000–120,000 Birr, and 23.7% had 
earned more than 120,000 Birr. Among the respondents, 3.3% reported that they had less than 2 
years of experience with the tax authority, 12.6% had 2–6 years, 25.1% had 6–10 years, 36.7% 
had 10–20 years, and 22.3% had more than 20 years of experience. In terms of ethnicity, 32% of 
the respondents described themselves as Oromo, 21.9% as Amhara, 14.2% as Tigray, 5.9% as 
Gurage, 10.5% as “other,” and 15.5% did not report their ethnic background. The ethnic 
composition of the Ethiopian respondents within the total number of respondents in this sample 
roughly mirrors the ethnic groups’ composition in the Ethiopian population; that is, 34.4% 
Oromos, 27% Amharas, 6.1% Tgrians, 2.5% Gurage, and 30% other. The “other” 30% 
comprises the remaining 76 ethnic groups. We coded income range of respondents as 1 = 20,000-
40,000 Birr, 2 = 40,000-60,000 Birr, 3 = 60,000-80,000 Birr, 4 = 80,000-100,00 Birr, 5 = 100,000-
120,000 Birr, and 6 = more than 120,000 Birr; years of experience with the tax authority as 1 = less 
than 2 years, 2 = 2-6 years, 3 = 6-10 years, 4 = 10-20 years, and 5 = more than 20 years; highest 
level of education attained as 1 = completed elementary school, 2 = completed high school, 3 = 
completed college diploma, 4 = completed first degree, 5 = completed master’s degree, and 6 = 
completed a PhD; ethnicity as 1 = Amhara, 2 = Tigray, 3 = Oromo, 4 = Gurage, and 5 = Other. 
For the Ethiopian sample, we used a printed questionnaire to collect the data. We collected 
the data over a period of three months, February-April, 2015. We distributed a total of 300 
questionnaires to working professionals. Accompanying the questionnaire was a cover letter and a 
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pre-paid reply envelope for enclosure of the filled-out questionnaire. The cover letter explained the 
intent of the study and guaranteed strict confidentiality of responses. Two hundred and twenty-
three questionnaires were returned (a response rate of 74%). Of these, six respondents skipped a 
significant number of questions and were therefore removed from the dataset. Accordingly, a total 
of 217 usable questionnaires were included in the analysis.  
The US sample consisted of 200 US income taxpayers. Respondents were invited online to 
participate in the study. All respondents responded to all questions, and hence there were no 
dropouts or missing values. We introduced the study as being about “how and why people decide 
to voluntarily comply with taxation or evade it.” Of the 200 respondents, 56.5% were male and 
43.5% were female. Respondents were between 19 and 75 years of age (Mage = 37.90, SDage = 
12.34). In terms of their highest level of education, 0.5% had completed elementary school only, 
18% had a high school diploma, 19% had completed vocational education, 50% had a bachelor’s 
degree, 10.5% had completed a master’s degree, and 2% had completed a PhD. With respect to 
their annual earnings, 20.3% of the respondents reported having annual earnings less than 20,000 
USD, 41.8% had earned 20,000–40,000 USD, 15.9% had earned 40,000–60,000 USD, 13% had 
earned 60,000–80,000 USD, 5.6% had earned 80,000–100,000 USD, and 3.4% had earned more 
than 100,000 USD. Among the respondents, 4% reported that they had less than 2 years of 
experience with the tax authority, 17.5% had 2–6 years, 13.5% had 6–10 years, 33% had 10–20 
years, and 32% had more than 20 years of experience. Regarding ethnic background, 79.5% of 
respondents identified themselves as White/Caucasian, 3% as Hispanic American, 10% as African 
American, 5.5% as Asian American, 0.5% as Native American, and 1.5% as “other” than those 
listed. Like in the Ethiopian sample, we coded income range of respondents as 1 = less than 20,000 
USD, 2 = 20,000-40,000 USD, 3 = 40,000-60,000 USD, 4 = 60,000-80,000 USD, 5 = 80,000-
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100,00 USD, 6 = more than 100,000 USD; years of experience with the tax authority as 1 = less 
than 2 years, 2 = 2-6 years, 3 = 6-10 years, 4 = 10-20 years, and 5 = more than 20 years; highest 
level of education attained as 1 = completed elementary school, 2 = completed high school 
diploma, 3 = completed vocational education, 4 = completed bachelor’s degree, 5 = completed 
master’s, and 6 = completed a PhD; ethnicity as 1 = White/Caucasian, 2 = Hispanic American, 3 = 
African American, 4 = Asian American, and 5 = Native American, and 6 = Other. 
For the US sample, we recruited participants via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) over a 
period of one week in May (13-21), 2015. AMT is an online community designed to bring 
researchers in contact with respondents who are willing to participate in research. AMT has 
become a popular platform for collecting data across the social sciences (Berinsky, Huber, & 
Lenz, 2012; Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012). For instance, studies have used AMT to address 
issues as diverse as generosity (Cryder, Loewenstein, & Scheines, 2013), cross-cultural 
variations in work outcomes (Uhlmann, Heaphy, Ashford, Zhu, & Sanchez-Burks, 2013), and 
procedural justice enactment (van Houwelingen, van Dijke, & De Cremer, 2014). Studies 
evaluating the validity of AMT have shown that the data obtained are reasonably reliable 
(Behrend, Sharek, & Meade, 2011; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci & Chandler, 
2014), while representativeness of such samples requires close scrutiny by recruiters (see 
Goodman & Paolacci, 2017). We return to this in the general discussion. 
4.2 Measures 
We used scales developed for developed countries to collect data in a developed (i.e., the US) and 
a developing county (i.e., Ethiopia). We did this because the scales are not specific to the context 
of developed countries; they have been utilized across cultures before; and most importantly, this 
makes comparison of results for developing and developed countries sensible. 
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We measured procedural justice with a 7-item scale1 developed and validated by Colquitt 
(2001). We used this scale rather than scales that have been used before in the tax compliance 
literature because these scales include items that do not refer to aspects of decision-making 
procedures, and they overlap with other constructs. For instance, Murphy’s (2004) measure of 
procedural justice of the tax authority contains items that measure trust. An example item that 
overlaps with trust is “The tax office treats people as if they can be trusted to do the right thing.” 
The Colquitt (2001) measure, on the other hand, is solely based on Leventhal’s (1980) and 
Thibaut & Walker's (1975) concept of procedural justice and measures the most common 
procedural justice criteria: voice, bias suppression, accuracy, consistency, and norm adherence. 
Therefore, we argue that this measure is an improvement over existing procedural justice 
measures in the tax compliance literature. We slightly adapted the Colquitt (2001) items to fit the 
context of procedural justice of the tax authority. Item examples (preceded by the stem “The 
following items refer to the procedures used to arrive at tax-related decisions.”) are “I have been 
able to express my views and feelings during those procedures” and “Those procedures have 
been free of bias” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). We averaged these items into a 
procedural justice scale. The complete adapted scale is found in Appendix A. 
Following Gobena and van Dijke (2016; see also Gangl et al., 2015; Gangl et al., 2012), we 
measured trust with the 6-item cognition-based trust scale developed by McAllister (1995). We 
used this scale rather than other scales that have been used before in the tax compliance literature 
because these scales include items that overlap with items of procedural justice of the tax authority. 
Murphy’s (2004) measure of institutional trust in the tax authority, for instance, contains items that 
measure the fairness of the tax authority’s decision-making procedures. We slightly adapted the 
McAllister (1995) items to fit the context of cognition-based trust in the tax authority. Item 
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examples are “The tax officials approach their job with professionalism and dedication” and 
“Given these officials’ track record, I see no reason to doubt their competence and preparation for 
their job” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). We averaged the items into one scale. The 
complete scale is found in Appendix A of Gobena and van Dijke (2016). 
We measured voluntary tax compliance with a 10-item scale from Gobena and van Dijke 
(2016) adapted from Kirchler and Wahl (2010). Item examples (preceded by the stem “When I pay 
my taxes as required by the [Ethiopian/US] tax laws and regulations, I do so...”) are “…because I 
pay my taxes voluntarily” and “…without spending a long time thinking how I could reduce 
them” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). We averaged the items to create a voluntary 
compliance index. The complete scale is found in Appendix A of Gobena and van Dijke (2016). 
We measured enforced tax compliance with an 8-item scale from Gobena and van Dijke 
(2016) adapted from Kirchler and Wahl (2010). Item examples (preceded by the stem “When I pay 
my taxes as required by the [Ethiopian/US] tax laws and regulations, I do so…”) are “…because 
I feel forced to pay my taxes” and “…because a great many tax audits are carried out” (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).  We averaged the items to create an enforced tax 
compliance index. The complete scale is found in Appendix A of Gobena and van Dijke (2016). 
We measured identification with the nation with a 10-item scale from Tyler and Blader 
(2001). We slightly adapted the items to fit the current context. Item examples are “My nation is 
important to the way I think of myself as a person” and “When someone praises the 
accomplishments of my nation, it feels like a personal compliment to me” (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). We averaged the items to create an identification index. The 
complete scale is found in Appendix A. 
5. Results 
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5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 1 and Table 2 present means, standard deviations, Cronbach alpha coefficients, and 
correlations between the variables in the Ethiopian and US samples, respectively.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 & 2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
As can be seen in Table 1 and 2, in both samples, in line with prior work, all predictor 
variables, namely procedural justice (e.g., van Dijke & Verboon, 2010; Wenzel, 2002), trust in 
the tax authority (e.g., Gobena & van Dijke, 2016; Scholz & Lubell, 1998; van Dijke & Verboon, 
2010), and identification with the nation (e.g., Wenzel, 2002), had significant positive 
associations with voluntary tax compliance. Also in line with prior work, none of these variables 
were significantly associated with enforced tax compliance (Gobena & van Dijke, 2016), apart 
from trust in the US sample. This latter correlation is, in fact, in line with the slippery slope 
framework of tax compliance (Kirchler et al., 2008), which assumes that trust in and power of 
the tax authority are critical dimensions in understanding tax compliance. Specifically, while 
power of the tax authority elicits enforced compliance, trust in the authority leads to voluntary 
compliance (see Kirchler, 2007). The framework argues that if taxpayers' perception of the 
potential of tax officials to detect and punish tax evasions is interpreted as coercive (vs. 
legitimate) power, the level of enforced tax compliance increases, but the same interpretation 
damages trust in the tax authority. Consequently, trust in the tax authority and enforced tax 
compliance are argued to be negatively correlated.  
Tables 1 and 2 also show that trust, procedural justice, and identification are 
intercorrelated (as they were in all prior field studies that included trust or identification as 
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moderator of procedural justice effects; e.g., see De Cremer & Tyler, 2007; van Dijke & 
Verboon, 2010 for procedural justice and trust correlation; Wenzel, 2002; De Cremer, 2005 for 
procedural justice and identification correlation). However, these correlations are clearly lower 
than the threshold (i.e., .8 or .9) where multicollinearity issues can arise in the analyses that we 
used to test our hypothesis, that is regression analyses (see Mela, 2002; Tu, Kellett, Clerehugh, & 
Gilthorpe, 2005). 
Tables 1 and 2 also show that the US sample scored higher than the Ethiopian sample on 
voluntary tax compliance (4.95 vs. 4.51; t(199) = 3.52, p < .01), procedural justice (3.71 vs. 2.95; 
t(198) = -6.18, p < .01), and trust (3.74 vs. 3.17; t(198) = -4.53, p < .01). The higher scores on 
these variables are in line with the difference in the tax environments between these countries, 
with the Ethiopian tax environment, as noted earlier, sometimes being referred to as a “cops and 
robbers” type (see Bekana et al., 2014; Gobena & van Dijke, 2016). Identification was higher for 
the Ethiopian sample than the US sample (4.86 vs. 4.49; t(198) = 2.50, p = .01). This may reflect 
nationalism that has served to transcend political, social, economic, and cultural challenges in 
Ethiopia, which is argued to have resulted from Ethiopian nationalists’ continual attempts to 
harness national cohesion against threats from both within and outside of Ethiopia (see 
Gebrewold, 2009). 
5.2 Regression Analyses  
Because our research question pertains to establishing boundary conditions to known 
effects, we used moderated regression (Dawson & Richter, 2006; Hayes & Matthes, 2009; 
Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1995). We used this approach (i.e., the three-way analysis) rather than 
other options (e.g., splitting the sample at the mean of various variables and ANOVA) that are 
clearly suboptimal as they lead to loss of a lot of information (see Irwin & McClelland, 2003; 
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Royston, Altman, & Sauerbrei, 2006). Unlike the vast majority of studies in the tax compliance 
literature that used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (e.g., Murphy, 2004; Murphy & 
Tyler, 2008; van Dijke & Verboon, 2010), we used linear regression with robust standard errors. 
Robust standard errors help overcome the limitations of OLS regression that it is very sensitive 
to the presence of outliers and that it can easily inflate the standard errors of the slope 
coefficients when the criterion variable contains measurement error (see Adedia, Adebanji, 
Okyere, & Agyen, 2016; Alma, 2011)2. 
 Demographic variables did not significantly correlate with the predictor variables except 
business years with procedural justice and trust in the US sample. Therefore, we decided to not 
include them as controls in the regression analyses (Carlson & Wu, 2012).  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Table 3 presents the results of the regression analyses. As Table 3 shows, the R2 of the 
regression result is higher in the US than in the Ethiopian sample for step 1 of the regression. 
This likely occurs because trust has stronger main effect in the US sample in step 1 (and 
subsequent steps, of course) than in the Ethiopian sample. This difference could be caused by the 
difference in the tax environments – specifically, the Ethiopian respondents evaluating their 
relationship with the tax authority as antagonistic, which leads to lowered value of trust in the tax 
authority (see Bekana et al., 2014; Gobena & van Dijke, 2016). However, for steps 2 and 3, R2 
changes are similar for both samples. Importantly, the interaction of theoretical interest that we 
focused on in this paper is comparable across the two samples. 
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In step 1, in both the Ethiopian and the US sample, identification predicted voluntary tax 
compliance significantly, while procedural justice did not. In this step, trust predicted voluntary 
tax compliance only in the US sample. In step 2, the same main effect patterns as in step 1 
prevailed in both samples. Furthermore, in both samples, while the Procedural Justice × 
Identification interaction predicted voluntary tax compliance, the Procedural Justice × Trust 
interaction did not. The Trust × Identification interaction predicted voluntary tax compliance in 
the US sample, but not in the Ethiopian sample in step 2. We note that the sign of the Procedural 
Justice × Identification interaction was positive in the Ethiopian sample and negative in the US 
sample. Thus, in the Ethiopian sample, procedural justice is more strongly related to voluntary 
tax compliance among high (rather than low) identifiers; in the US sample, procedural justice is 
more strongly related to tax compliance among low (rather than high) identifiers. 
This difference may result from the difference in the tax climates from which the 
respondents were drawn. As noted, the Ethiopian tax climate is a typical “cops and robbers” type 
whereby the tax authority and the taxpayers work against each other (see Abdella & Clifford, 
2010; Gobena & van Dijke, 2016). In such an environment, justice may make sense only among 
those who strongly identify with the nation; weakly identifying citizens may consider all 
authorities’ decisions and procedures in a negative light (Lipponen, Wisse, & Perälä, 2011; 
Wenzel, 2002). On the other hand, in the more cooperative environment of the “client and 
service” tax climate in the US, high identifiers may not be as concerned about the fairness of 
authorities as low identifiers because high identifiers perceive authorities’ actions in a positive 
light regardless of their actions; low identifiers attend to procedural justice information to avoid 
abuse of power by the authorities (see Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996). 
In step 3, the main effects of procedural justice, trust, and identification were similar to 
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those in step 2. Furthermore, the Procedural Justice × Trust and Procedural Justice × 
Identification interactions did not predict voluntary tax compliance in both samples, whereas the 
Trust × Identification interaction continued to predict voluntary compliance only in the US 
sample. However, as predicted, the Procedural Justice × Trust × Identification interaction 
predicted voluntary tax compliance in both samples. Figure 1 visually presents the shape of this 
interaction for the Ethiopian sample; Figure 2 presents the shape of this interaction for the US 
sample. 
Because the variables were each measured on a 7-point scale, we treated the data as 
continuous and applied parametric tests without using dummy variables. In creating the 
categories in Figures 1 and 2, we used the Excel facility provided by Dawson (2014) that 
automatically yields coefficients used in plotting the interaction graphs. For this plotting, the 
criterion was always 1 SD below/above the mean. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
We proceeded to test our hypothesis with simple slopes analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). 
Simple slopes analysis is a follow-up analysis that shows whether a specific effect (i.e., the 
Procedural Justice × Trust interaction, and the main effect of procedural justice) is significantly 
different from zero as a function of the moderator value, something that moderated regression 
itself cannot tell (see Aiken & West, 1991; Dawson & Richter, 2006; Robinson, Tomek, & 
Schumacker, 2013). In support of our hypothesis, this analysis showed that the Procedural 
Justice × Trust interaction significantly predicted voluntary tax compliance when identification 
was low (1 SD below the mean) in the Ethiopian sample (β = -.20, t = -2.00, p = .04) and the US 
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sample (β = -.22, t = -2.00, p = .04). However, when identification was high (1 SD above the 
mean), the Procedural Justice × Trust interaction did not significantly predict voluntary 
compliance in the Ethiopian sample (β = .04, t = .46, p = .65) or the US sample (β = .03, t = .45, 
p = .65). Thus, among citizens who weakly identify with the nation, the relationship between 
procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance varied significantly as a function of their level 
of trust in the authority. However, for citizens who strongly identify with the nation, the 
relationship between procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance did not significantly vary 
as a function of their level of trust in the tax authority.  
 We proceeded with further simple slopes tests to decompose the simple Procedural Justice 
× Trust interaction among low and high identifiers. In line with our argument, for the Ethiopian 
sample, the results of this analysis showed that when identification was low (1 SD below the 
mean) and trust was low (1 SD below the mean), the relationship between procedural justice and 
compliance was positive and significant (β = .31, t = 2.01, p = .04). When identification was low 
(1 SD below the mean) and trust was high (1 SD above the mean), the relationship between 
procedural justice and compliance was significant and negative (β = -.28, t = -2.50, p = .01). A 
potential explanation for this unpredicted relationship could be the “cops and robbers” climate 
that the Ethiopian respondents have become used to. These respondents may value a match 
between the actions of the tax authority represented by low procedural justice and their 
experience with the authority. This perceived match (while trust is high, suggesting respondents 
believe they will not be taken advantage of) may have resulted in positive responses to low 
(compared to high) procedural justice. However, this is speculation and we leave open the 
possibility that this specific simple relationship between low (vs. high) procedural justice and 
high tax compliance is a statistical fluke, as it did not also replicate in the US sample (see 
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below).   
In the US sample, when identification was low and trust was low (1 SD below the mean), 
the relationship between procedural justice and compliance was positive and significant (β = .45, 
t = 2.72, p = .01). When identification was low (1 SD below the mean) and trust was high (1 SD 
above the mean), the relationship between procedural justice and compliance was not significant 
(β = -.01, t = -.02, p = .98). 
Although at high levels of identification the simple slopes of the relationship between 
procedural justice and voluntary compliance did not significantly differ as a function of the level 
of trust, we nevertheless conducted simple slopes analyses to test if, among highly identifying 
citizens, the simple slopes may be significantly different from 0. In the Ethiopian sample, these 
analyses showed that, when identification was high, procedural justice did not predict voluntary 
tax compliance at both low (β = .21, t = .93, p = .36) and high (β = .26, t = 1.61, p = .11) levels of 
trust. Similarly, in the US sample, when identification was high, procedural justice did not 
predict voluntary compliance regardless of whether trust was low (β = -.11, t = -.74, p = .46) or 
high (β = -.04, t = -.23, p = .82).  
Appendix B shows that trust was significantly and negatively associated with enforced tax 
compliance in the US but not the Ethiopian sample. Furthermore, the three-way interaction that 
we predicted for voluntary tax compliance was not significant with enforced tax compliance as a 
criterion variable in both samples. This boosts our confidence in our specific argument that 
addresses fear of exploitation and identification and subsequent goal internalization as precursors 
of voluntary tax compliance. We also note that the sample of origin (Ethiopia vs. US) did not 
moderate our results3. 
6. General Discussion 
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We showed that procedural justice of the tax authority is positively related to voluntary tax 
compliance particularly among citizens with low (vs. high) trust in this authority. However, this 
Procedural Justice × Trust interaction was limited to citizens who weakly (vs. strongly) identify 
with their country. More specifically, high (vs. low) procedural justice predicts increased 
voluntary compliance only when identification is low and trust is simultaneously low. We 
obtained this effect in two samples, one of income taxpayers in a developing country (Ethiopia) 
and one of income taxpayers in a developed country (the US). In line with our expectations, we 
found no interactive effect of procedural justice, trust, and identification on enforced tax 
compliance. In the following sections we discuss the implications and limitations of these findings.  
6.1 Theoretical Implications 
Procedural justice is one of the most often studied and most established antecedents of voluntary 
compliance with the tax authority (e.g., Doyle, Gallery, Coyle, & Commissioners, 2009; Hartner 
et al., 2008).  However, as noted, prior studies have not always revealed consistent results. Some 
studies showed that high procedural justice is positively related to voluntary tax compliance 
(e.g., Alm et al., 1993; Farrar, 2015; Hogan, Maroney, & Rupert, 2012; Murphy, 2004; Murphy 
& Tyler, 2008). But other studies did not consistently show such a relationship (e.g., Porcano, 
1988; Wenzel, 2002; Worsham, 1996). By identifying boundary conditions to the effect of 
procedural justice on voluntary compliance, we increase our understanding of when procedural 
justice can be expected to promote voluntary compliance and when this cannot be expected. Our 
research thus also suggests why prior research sometimes succeeded and sometimes failed in 
revealing a significant relationship between procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance. Of 
course, the inconsistency in prior findings might also be (partly) attributable to the way 
procedural justice of the tax authority was operationalized, as we highlighted in the measures 
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part of our study. 
Second, prior work has identified trust in the tax authority and identification with the 
nation as factors that explain why procedural justice leads to voluntary tax compliance. 
However, until now, no work has considered how trust and identification processes may relate to 
each other. By including both variables as moderators of the relationship between procedural 
justice and voluntary compliance, the present research reveals how these two processes 
interrelate. Individuals respond positively (i.e., with increased tax compliance) to high 
procedural justice when they have low (vs. high) trust in the tax authority. In other words, low 
trust makes individuals focus on procedural justice information to assess whether they want to 
contribute to the collective. However, strong identification with the nation overrides these 
concerns, as identification implies that one internalizes collective goals, thus making one care 
less about one’s own personal outcomes. Our research thus suggests that the processes described 
in fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001) are fundamentally self-focused in nature; they disappear 
under strong identification with the nation. 
By being the first to test a tax compliance hypothesis in a developing as well as a 
developed nation, our research also contributes to the tax compliance literature more broadly. 
One important limitation of the extant literature is that little research has explored tax 
compliance in developing countries, in contrast to the extensive studies conducted in Western 
nations (Doyle, Frecknall-Hughes, & Summers, 2009; Saad, 2011; Torgler & Schneider, 2007). 
Because of this scarcity of tax compliance studies in developing countries (for exceptions, see 
Abdul–Razak & Adafula, 2013; Alabede, Ariffin, & Idris, 2011; Gobena & van Dijke, 2016; 
Smulders & Naidoo, 2013), there is virtually no comparison of results across cultures. Yet, as 
noted, the tax environment in many developing countries differs in important ways from that in 
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Europe and the US, as in developing countries (more than in developed nations), taxpayers 
usually do not view paying taxes as a contribution to the buildup and maintenance of common 
public goods (Asaminew, 2010; Fjeldstad & Semboja, 2001; Gangl, Torgler, Kirchler, & 
Hofmann, 2014). Of course, taxpayers’ determination to evade taxes in developing countries 
seems to reciprocate the actions of tax authorities, who often show little trust in taxpayers as 
reasonable citizens and seem to believe that coercion can solve all problems related to tax (non-) 
compliance, contrary to the relations in developed countries. This is also illustrated in our 
research, in which we found that the level of trust of taxpayers in tax authorities, the level of 
perceived procedural justice, and the level of voluntary compliance are higher in the US than in 
Ethiopia. Our tests of the hypothesis in two samples that are very divergent in terms of their tax 
environments and tax morale clearly contribute to the confidence that we can have in these 
findings and, more generally, contribute to our confidence in the social psychological approach 
to stimulate voluntary tax compliance across the world. 
6.2 Practical Implications 
We contribute to the practice of tax administration in two ways. First, the most important policy 
alternatives to deal with self-focused taxpayers who weakly identify with the nation are for the tax 
authority to either work in a way that it would be perceived by those taxpayers as being high in 
procedural justice or to be sufficiently coercive as to deter tax evasion. This last alternative is being 
followed by most authorities in developing countries, who have not worked hard to build mutual 
trust with their citizens (Bekana et al., 2014; Fjeldstad, 2001). However, it is a costly approach 
(Alm, Kirchler, & Muehlbacher, 2012; Alm, Kirchler, Muehlbacher, Gangl, Hofmann, Kogler, & 
Pollai, 2012; Gangl et al., 2015; Murphy & Tyler, 2008) that likely drains the meager tax money 
that authorities in these countries collect. Our findings highlight that procedural justice is 
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particularly important in order to foster voluntary tax compliance for authorities who are not 
trusted by citizens who weakly identify with their nation.  
Second, we contribute to the manner in which tax authorities may have to administer 
taxation in order to initiate and sustain a high level of voluntary compliance with taxation through 
an interaction between procedural justice, trust, and identification with the nation. We found that 
identification with the nation, in its own right, significantly predicts voluntary tax compliance in 
both samples. This implies that individuals internalize the values and norms of the group with 
which they identify and voluntarily cooperate with the authorities that represent the group. 
Therefore, it is important to work on policies and procedures that beget citizens’ identification with 
the nation (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1996). 
6.3 Limitations 
Our study is not without limitations. A first limitation results from the cross-sectional nature of 
our study, which does not allow drawing causal conclusions. Future studies should clarify the 
causal links between the study variables using experimental or longitudinal designs. Yet it should 
be noted that prior experimental studies (e.g. Doyle, Gallery, Coyle, & Commissioners, 2009; 
van Dijke & Verboon, 2010), including field experiments (Wenzel, 2006), provided causal 
support for the effect of procedural justice on voluntary tax compliance. Future research should 
address the causal roles of trust in authorities and identification with the nation in experimental 
settings, for instance, using bogus pipeline procedures (e.g., Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; 
van Dijke & De Cremer, 2010).   
A second limitation is that our nonrandom sampling technique in both samples likely 
hampered the representativeness of our respondents for the populations from which they were 
drawn. The use of AMT is particularly criticized on the ground that the sample recruited does not 
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represent the US population (see Goodman and Paolacci, 2017). Nevertheless, since our intent is 
testing theory rather than generalizing the finding to a specific population, the use of nonrandom 
samples does not limit our conclusions. This is because while testing theory, all measures are 
indirect indicators of theoretical constructs, and no methodological procedures taken alone can 
produce external validity (see Lucas, 2003). We also argue that our studies are high in ecological 
validity (see Leary, 2012) relative to prior field studies, which were conducted almost solely in 
Western countries. That is because the dissimilarity of the two samples provides strength to the 
conclusions we draw, as replication of results over distinct nonrandom samples implies 
dependability of the results. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Procedural justice is one of the most useful and practical tools that have been identified by 
social-psychological research to stimulate voluntary tax compliance. The present research helps 
us to understand why this effect is not always found, what the processes are that underlie this 
effect, and how general the effect is across different taxation climates. Investigating interactions 
between established antecedents of voluntary tax compliance can thus result in theoretical 
progress as well as practically useful results that are applicable in both developing and developed 
nations. 
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Notes 
1. Items 2 and 6 from the Colquitt (2001) measure refer to “outcomes” of the authority’s 
decision. We assumed that respondents in both samples would understand what such 
outcomes can be (e.g., individual taxpayers winning a tax refund claim, adjustments made to 
tax rates, or selection of taxpayers for tax audit). The Ethiopian sample consisted of business 
owners who likely had experience in interacting with the tax authority. The US respondents 
would have also had experience in interacting with the tax authority, as the United States 
federal and state income tax systems are self-assessment systems requiring that taxpayers 
must declare, file, and pay taxes without assessment by the taxing authority; the relevant tax 
authority later decides on which taxpayers to audit (see Roach, 2010). Analyses showed that 
in both samples the Procedural Justice × Trust and Trust × Identification was similar in shape 
and significance regardless of whether the two items containing a reference to “decision 
outcomes” were included or not. 
2. We conducted OLS regression analyses in addition to the robust regression results reported 
in the main text. We did this to see if our results differ when OLS regression is used. We 
opted to not report OLS regression results in the main text because OLS regression is 
sensitive to the presence of outliers. Besides, when the criterion variable contains errors 
(such as those occurring when it is measured with self-report scales), the standard errors of 
the slope coefficients become inflated (although the estimation of the slopes is unbiased) 
when OLS regression is used. The OLS regression revealed results that were almost identical 
to the results presented in the main text. There were two differences. First, short of 
supporting our hypothesis, in the Ethiopian sample, the simple slope for the effect of 
procedural justice on voluntary compliance when identification was low (1 SD below the 
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mean) and trust was also low (1 SD below the mean) was not significant (β = .20, t = .91, p = 
.36). Second, contrary to the result in linear regression with robust standard errors and in 
support of our hypothesis, in the Ethiopian sample, the simple slope for the effect of 
procedural justice on compliance when identification was low (1 SD below the mean) and 
trust was high (1 SD above the mean) was not significant (β = -.28, t = -1.60, p = .11).  
3. To test whether any of the results differed significantly between the two samples, we 
combined the two datasets and tested if sample of origin (i.e., Ethiopian vs. US sample) 
moderated any of the main effects, simple interactions, or the three-way interaction of 
procedural justice, trust, and identification. We found no evidence that the sample moderates 
any of these effects. 
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Appendix A 
Below is a list of two of the measures used in this paper. All responses were on a Likert scale (1 
= strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = moderately disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 5 = 
moderately agree, 6 = agree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Procedural Justice (Colquitt, 2001) 
The following items refer to the procedures used to arrive at tax-related decisions. 
1. I have been able to express my views and feelings during those procedures. 
2. I have had influence over the (outcomes) arrived at by those procedures. 
3. Those procedures have been applied consistently. 
4. Those procedures have been free of bias. 
5. Those procedures have been based on accurate information. 
6. I have been able to appeal the (outcomes) arrived at by those procedures. 
7. Those procedures have upheld ethical and moral standards. 
Identification with the Nation (Tyler & Blader, 2001) 
1. My nation is important to the way I think of myself as a person.  
2. When someone praises the accomplishments of my nation, it feels like a personal 
compliment to me.  
3. When I talk about my nation I usually say “we” rather than “they.”  
4. I feel a sense that I personally belong to Ethiopia/the US.  
5. I feel that the problems of my nation are my own personal problems.  
6. When someone from outside criticizes my nation, it feels like a personal insult.  
7. I feel like a valued member of my nation.  
8. When something goes wrong in my nation, I feel a personal responsibility to fix it.  
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9. My nation says a lot about who I am as a person.  
10. I do not feel like an important part of my nation (reverse coded). 
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Appendix B 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Appendix B about here 
----------------------------------------- 
JUSTICE, TAXPAYERS’ IDENTITY, AND TAX COMPLIANCE   34 
 
References 
Abdul–Razak, A., & Adafula, C. J. (2013). Evaluating taxpayers’ attitude and its influence on 
tax compliance decisions in Tamale, Ghana. Journal of Accounting and Taxation, 5(3), 
48-57. doi: 10.5897/JAT2013.0120 
Abraham, W. T., & Russell, D. W. (2008). Statistical power analysis in psychological research. 
Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(1), 283-301. 
Adedia, D., Adebanji, A., Okyere, E., & Agyen, J. K. (2016). Leverages, outliers and the 
performance of robust regression estimators. British Journal of Mathematics & Computer 
Science, 15(3), 1-14. doi:10.9734/BJMCS/2016/24281 
Aguinis, H., Beaty, J. C., Boik, R. J., & Pierce, C. A. (2005). Effect size and power in assessing 
moderating effects of categorical variables using multiple regression: A 30-year review. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 90(1), 94-107. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.90.1.94 
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Alabede, J. O., Ariffin, Z. B. Z., & Idris, K. M. (2011). Does ethnicity matter in individual 
taxpayer’s compliance behaviour? Empirical evidence from Nigeria. Economics and 
Finance Review, 1(8), 18-30.  
Alma, Ö. G. (2011). Comparison of robust regression methods in linear regression. International 
Journal of Contemporary Mathematics Sciences, 6(9), 409-421.  
Alm, J. (2012). Measuring, explaining, and controlling tax evasion: Lessons from theory, 
experiments, and field studies. International Tax and Public Finance, 19(1), 54–77. doi: 
10.1007/s10797-011-9171-2 
JUSTICE, TAXPAYERS’ IDENTITY, AND TAX COMPLIANCE   35 
 
Alm, J., Jackson, B. R., & McKee, M. (1993). Fiscal exchange, collective decision institutions, 
and tax compliance. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 22(3), 285-303. doi: 
10.1016/0167-2681(93)90003-8 
Alm, J., Kirchler, E., & Muehlbacher, S. (2012). Combining psychology and economics in the 
analysis of compliance: From enforcement to cooperation. Economic Analysis and 
Policy, 42(2), 133-151.  
Alm, J., Kirchler, E., Muehlbacher, S., Gangl, K., Hofmann, E., Kogler, C., & Pollai, M. (2012). 
Rethinking the research paradigms for analysing tax compliance behaviour. CESifo 
Forum, 13(2), 33-40.  
Alm, J., McClelland, G. H., & Schulze, W. D. (1999). Changing the social norm of tax 
compliance by voting. Kyklos, 52(2), 141-171.  
Asaminew, E. (2010). The underground economy and tax evasion in Ethiopia: Implications for 
tax policy. Addis Ababa: Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute/Ethiopian 
Economic Association. 
Barkworth, J. M., & Murphy, K. (2015). Procedural justice policing and citizen compliance 
behaviour: The importance of emotion. Psychology, Crime & Law, 21(3), 254-273.  
Behrend, T. S., Sharek, D. J., & Meade, A. W. (2011). The viability of crowdsourcing for survey 
research. Behavior Research Methods, 43(3), 800-813. doi: 10.3758/s13428-011-0081-0 
Bekana, D. M., Gobena, L. B., & Yibrah, D. G. (2014). Evaluation of Ethiopian tax 
administration system: Emphasis on taxpayers' compliance. Journal of Business and 
Administrative Studies, 6(2), 46-75.  
JUSTICE, TAXPAYERS’ IDENTITY, AND TAX COMPLIANCE   36 
 
Berinsky, A. J., Huber, G. A., & Lenz, G. S. (2012). Evaluating online labor markets for 
experimental research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk. Political Analysis, 20(3), 351–
368. doi: doi:10.1093/pan/mpr057 
Bird, R. M., & Zolt, E. M. (2008). Tax policy in emerging countries. Environment and Planning 
C: Government and Policy, 26, 73-86. doi: 10.1068/cav3 
Blader, S. L., & Tyler, T. R. (2015). Relational models of procedural justice. In R. Cropanzano 
& M. L. Ambrose (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of justice in work organizations (pp. 351-
370). Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Brockner, J., Tyler, T. R., & Cooper-Schneider, R. (1992). The influence of prior commitment to 
an institution on reactions to perceived unfairness: The higher they are, the harder they 
fall. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(2), 241-261. doi: 10.2307/2393223 
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's Mechanical Turk a new source 
of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(1), 3-5.  
Carlson, K. D., & Wu, J. (2012). The illusion of statistical control: Control variable practice in 
management research. Organizational Research Methods, 15(3), 413-435. doi: 
10.1177/1094428111428817 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2 ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Colquitt, J. A. (2001). On the dimensionality of organizational justice: A construct validation of 
a measure. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(3), 386-400. doi: 10.1037//0021-
9010.86.3.386 
JUSTICE, TAXPAYERS’ IDENTITY, AND TAX COMPLIANCE   37 
 
Cryder, C. E., Loewenstein, G., & Scheines, R. (2013). The donor is in the details. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 120(1), 15-23. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.08.002 
Dawson, J. F. (2014). Moderation in management research: What, why, when, and how. Journal 
of Business and Psychology, 29(1), 1-19.  
Dawson, J. F., & Richter, A. W. (2006). Probing three-way interactions in moderated multiple 
regression: Development and application of a slope difference test. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 91(4), 917-926. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.91.4.917 
De Cremer, D. (2005). Procedural and distributive justice effects moderated by organizational 
identification. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 20(1), 4-13. doi: 
10.1108/02683940510571603 
De Cremer, D., & Tyler, T. R. (2005). Managing group behavior: The interplay between 
procedural justice, sense of self, and cooperation. In M. Zanna & J. Olson (Eds.), 
Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 151–218). New York, NY: Academic 
Press. 
De Cremer, D., & Tyler, T. R. (2007). The effects of trust in authority and procedural fairness on 
cooperation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92(3), 639-649. doi: 10.1037/0021-
9010.92.3.639 
Debere, T. (2014). Business taxpayers’ satisfaction with the tax system in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
(Master's Thesis), Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia, Addis Ababa.    
Devos, K. (2014). Do penalties and enforcement measures make taxpayers more compliant? The 
view of Australian tax evaders. Journal of Business and Economics, 5(2), 265-284.  
JUSTICE, TAXPAYERS’ IDENTITY, AND TAX COMPLIANCE   38 
 
Doosje, B., Ellemers, N., & Spears, R. (1995). Perceived intragroup variability as a function of 
group status and identification. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 31(5), 410-
436. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jesp.1995.1018 
Doyle, E., Frecknall-Hughes, J., & Summers, B. (2009). Research methods in taxation ethics: 
Developing the defining issues test (DIT) for a tax-specific scenario. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 88(1), 35-52.  
Doyle, E., Gallery, K., Coyle, M., & Commissioners, I. R. (2009). Procedural justice principles 
and tax compliance in Ireland: A preliminary exploration in the context of reminder 
letters. Journal of Finance and Management in Public Services, 8(1), 49-62.  
Ereş, F., Gülcan, M. G., & Çelik, S. (2014). Primary school teachers’ perceptions of justice and 
trust in principals in Ankara. American International Journal of Contemporary Research, 
4(2), 33-41.  
Farrar, J. (2015). An empirical analysis of taxpayers fairness preferences from Canada's taxpayer 
bill of rights. Journal of Accounting and Taxation, 7(5), 71-79. doi: 
10.5897/JAT2015.0183 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A.-G. (2009). Statistical power analyses using g* 
power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. Behavior Research Methods, 
41(4), 1149-1160. doi: 10.3758/BRM.41.4.1149 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. (2001). Taxation, coercion and donors: Local government tax enforcement in 
Tanzania. The Journal of Modern African Studies: A Quarterly Survey of Politics, 
Economics and Related Topics in Contemporary Africa, 39(02), 289-306.  
JUSTICE, TAXPAYERS’ IDENTITY, AND TAX COMPLIANCE   39 
 
Fjeldstad, O.-H., & Semboja, J. (2001). Why people pay taxes: The case of the development levy 
in Tanzania. World Development, 29(12), 2059-2074. doi: 10.1016/s0305-
750x(01)00081-x 
Frey, B. S., & Meier, S. (2004). Pro-social behavior in a natural setting. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 54(1), 65-88. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.10.001 
Gangl, K., Hofmann, E., & Kirchler, E. (2015). Tax authorities' interaction with taxpayers: A 
conception of compliance in social dilemmas by power and trust. New Ideas in 
Psychology, 37(0), 13-23. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2014.12.001 
Gangl, K., Hofmann, E. B., Pollai, M., & Kirchler, E. (2012). The dynamics of power and trust 
in the "slippery slope framework" and its impact on the tax climate. Available at SSRN 
2024946.  
Gangl, K., Torgler, B., Kirchler, E., & Hofmann, E. (2014). Effects of supervision on tax 
compliance: Evidence from a field experiment in Austria. Economics Letters, 123(3), 
378-382. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.027 
Gebrewold, B. (2009). Ethiopian nationalism: An ideology to transcend all odds. Africa 
Spectrum, 79-97.  
Gobena, L. B., & van Dijke, M. (2016). Power, justice, and trust: A moderated mediation 
analysis of tax compliance among Ethiopian business owners. Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 52(2016), 24-37. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2015.11.004 
Goodman, J. K., & Paolacci, G. (2017). Crowdsourcing consumer research. Journal of Consumer 
Research(2017), 1-15. doi:10.1093/jcr/ucx047 
 
JUSTICE, TAXPAYERS’ IDENTITY, AND TAX COMPLIANCE   40 
 
Guibernau, M. (2004). Anthony D. Smith on nations and national identity: A critical assessment. 
Nations and Nationalism, 10(1-2), 125-141.  
Hartl, B., Hofmann, E., Gangl, K., Hartner-Tiefenthaler, M., & Kirchler, E. (2015). Does the sole 
description of a tax authority affect tax evasion? The impact of described coercive and 
legitimate power. PLoS ONE, 10(4), 1-19. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0123355 
Hartner-Tiefenthaler, M., Rechberger, S., & Kirchler, E. (2013). Justice perceptions and 
cooperation of citizens with the tax-authorities: The group engagement model of 
cooperation. Citizenship Teaching & Learning, 8(2), 179-193. doi: 10.1386/ctl.8.2.179_1 
Hartner, M., Kirchler, E., Poschalko, A., & Rechberger, S. (2010). Taxpayers' compliance by 
procedural and interactional fairness perceptions and social identity. Psychology & 
Economics, 3(1), 12-31.  
Hartner, M., Rechberger, S., Kirchler, E., & Schabmann, A. (2008). Procedural fairness and tax 
compliance. Economic Analysis and Policy, 38(1), 137-152. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0313-5926(08)50010-5 
Hayes, A. F., & Matthes, J. (2009). Computational procedures for probing interactions in OLS 
and logistic regression: SPSS and SAS implementations. Behavior Research Methods, 
41(3), 924-936. doi: 10.3758/brm.41.3.924 
Hegtvedt, K. A., Ganem, N. M., Waldron, K. W., & Brody, L. M. (2009). When will the 
unaffected seek justice for others? Perceptions of and responses to another's injustice. 
Australian Journal of Psychology, 61(1), 22-31. doi: 10.1080/00049530802607613 
Hofmann, E., Gangl, K., Kirchler, E., & Stark, J. (2014). Enhancing tax compliance through 
coercive and legitimate power of tax authorities by concurrently diminishing or 
JUSTICE, TAXPAYERS’ IDENTITY, AND TAX COMPLIANCE   41 
 
facilitating trust in tax authorities. Law and Policy, 36(3), 290-313. doi: 
10.1111/lapo.12021 
Hogan, B., Maroney, J. J., & Rupert, T. J. (2012). The relation among voice value, policy 
outcomes, and intensity of support on fairness assessments of tax legislation. The Journal 
of the American Taxation Association, 35(1), 85-109. doi: 10.2308/atax-50351 
Huddy, L., & Khatib, N. (2007). American patriotism, national identity, and political 
involvement. American Journal of Political Science, 51(1), 63-77.  
Huo, Y. J., Smith, H. J., Tyler, T. R., & Lind, E. A. (1996). Superordinate identification, 
subgroup identification, and justice concerns: Is separatism the problem; Is assimilation 
the answer? Psychological Science, 7(1), 40-45. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1996.tb00664.x 
Irwin, J. R., & McClelland, G. H. (2003). Negative consequences of dichotomizing continuous 
predictor variables. Journal of Marketing Research, 40(3), 366-371.  
Kirchler, E., Hoelzl, E., & Wahl, I. (2008). Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The 
“slippery slope” framework. Journal of Economic Psychology, 29(2), 210-225. doi: 
10.1016/j.joep.2007.05.004 
Kirchler, E., & Wahl, I. (2010). Tax compliance inventory tax-I: Designing an inventory for 
surveys of tax compliance. Journal of Economic Psychology, 31(3), 331-346. doi: 
10.1016/j.joep.2010.01.002 
Leary, M. R. (2012). Introduction to behavioral research methods (6 ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson 
Education, Inc. 
Leventhal, G. S. (1980). What should be done with equity theory? Washington, D.C.: Springer. 
JUSTICE, TAXPAYERS’ IDENTITY, AND TAX COMPLIANCE   42 
 
Lind, E. A. (2001). Fairness heuristic theory: Justice judgments as pivotal cognitions in 
organizational relations. In J. Greenberg & R. Cropanzano (Eds.), Advances in 
organizational justice (pp. 56-88). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 Lind, E. A., & Tyler, T. R. (1988). The social psychology of procedural justice. New York, NY: 
Plenum Press. 
Lipponen, J., Wisse, B., & Perälä, J. (2011). Perceived justice and group identification. Journal 
of Personnel Psychology, 10(1), 13-23. doi:10.1027/1866-5888/a000029 
Lucas, J. W. (2003). Theory-testing, generalization, and the problem of external validity. 
Sociological Theory, 21(3), 236-253.  
Masterson, S. S., Lewis, K., Goldman, B. M., & Taylor, M. S. (2000). Integrating justice and 
social exchange: The differing effects of fair procedures and treatment on work 
relationships. Academy of Management Journal, 43(4), 738-748.  
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational 
trust. The Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 709-734.  
McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect- and cognition-based trust as foundations for interpersonal 
cooperation in organizations. The Academy of Management Journal, 38(1), 24-59. doi: 
10.2307/256727 
Mela, C. F. (2002). The impact of collinearity on regression analysis: The asymmetric effect of 
negative and positive correlations. Applied Economics, 34(6), 667-677. doi: 
10.1080/0003684011005848 2 
Murphy, K. (2004). The role of trust in nurturing compliance: A study of accused tax avoiders. 
Law and Human Behavior, 28(2), 187-209. doi: 10.1023/B:LAHU.0000022322.94776.ca 
JUSTICE, TAXPAYERS’ IDENTITY, AND TAX COMPLIANCE   43 
 
Murphy, K., & Tyler, T. (2008). Procedural justice and compliance behaviour: The mediating 
role of emotions. European Journal of Social Psychology, 38(4), 652-668. doi: 
10.1002/ejsp.502 
Palil, M. R. (2010). Tax knowledge and tax compliance determinants in self assessment system in 
Malaysia. (PhD Dissertation), University of Birmingham, Birmingham.    
Paolacci, G., & Chandler, J. (2014). Inside the turk: Understanding Mechanical Turk as a 
participant pool. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23(3), 184-188. doi: 
10.1177/0963721414531598 
Porcano, T. M. (1988). Correlates of tax evasion. Journal of Economic Psychology, 9(1), 47-67. 
doi: 10.1016/0167-4870(88)90031-1 
Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2012). Spontaneous giving and calculated greed. 
Nature, 489(7416), 35–57. doi: 10.1038/nature11467 
Roach, B. (2010). Taxes in the United States: History, fairness, and current political issues. 
Paper presented at the global development and environment institute progressive and 
regressive taxation in the united states: who's really paying (and not paying) their fair 
share?, Medford, MA. 
Robinson, C. D., Tomek, S., & Schumacker, R. (2013). Tests of moderation effects: Difference 
in simple slopes versus the interaction term. Multiple Linear Regression Viewpoints, 
39(1), 16-25.  
Rosnow, R. L., & Rosenthal, R. (1995). “Some things you learn aren't so”: Cohen's paradox, 
Asch's paradigm, and the interpretation of interaction. Psychological Science, 6(1), 3-9.  
JUSTICE, TAXPAYERS’ IDENTITY, AND TAX COMPLIANCE   44 
 
Royston, P., Altman, D. G., & Sauerbrei, W. (2006). Dichotomizing continuous predictors in 
multiple regression: A bad idea. Statistics in Medicine, 25(1), 127-141. doi: 
10.1002/sim.2331 
Saad, N. (2011). Fairness perceptions and compliance behaviour: Taxpayers' judgments in self-
assessment environments. (PhD Dissertation), University of Canterbury, Canterbury. 
Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10092/5065 
Schatz, R. T., & Lavine, H. (2007). Waving the flag: National symbolism, social identity, and 
political engagement. Political Psychology, 28(3), 329-355.  
Schneider, F. (2015). Size and development of the shadow economy of 31 European and 5 other 
OECD countries from 2003 to 2015: Different developments. 
Schneider, F., & Enste, D. H. (2013). The shadow economy: An international survey. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Scholz, J. T., & Lubell, M. (1998). Trust and taxpaying: Testing the heuristic approach to 
collective action. American Journal of Political Science, 42(2), 398-417.  
Serra, P. (2003). Measuring the performance of Chile's tax administration. National Tax Journal, 
56(2), 373-383.  
Shieh, G. (2010). Sample size determination for confidence intervals of interaction effects in 
moderated multiple regression with continuous predictor and moderator variables. 
Behavior Research Methods, 42(3), 824-835. doi:10.3758/BRM.42.3.824 
Slemrod, J. (1990). Optimal taxation and optimal tax systems. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 4(1), 157-178.  
Smulders, S., & Naidoo, G. (2013). Addressing the small business tax compliance burden – 
evidence from South Africa. Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences, 6(1), 33-53.  
JUSTICE, TAXPAYERS’ IDENTITY, AND TAX COMPLIANCE   45 
 
Thibaut, J. W., & Walker, L. (1975). Procedural justice: A psychological analysis. Hillsdale, 
N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Torgler, B., & Schneider, F. (2007). Shadow economy, tax morale, governance and institutional 
quality: A panel analysis. CESifo Working Paper No. 1923. Munich (Center for 
Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research). 
Tu, Y.-K., Kellett, M., Clerehugh, V., & Gilthorpe, M. S. (2005). Problems of correlations 
between explanatory variables in multiple regression analyses in the dental literature. 
British Dental Journal, 199(7), 457-461. doi:10.1038/sj.bdj.4812743 
Tyler, T., Degoey, P., & Smith, H. J. (1996). Understanding why the justice of group procedures 
matters: A test of the psychological dynamics of the group-value model. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 70(5), 913-930.  
Tyler, T. R. (1989). The psychology of procedural justice: A test of the group-value model. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(5), 830-838.  
Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2000). Cooperation in groups: Procedural justice, social identity, 
and behavioral engagement. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. 
Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2001). Identity and cooperative behavior in groups. Group 
Processes & Intergroup Relations, 4(3), 207-226. doi: 10.1177/1368430201004003003 
Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2003). The group engagement model: Procedural justice, social 
identity, and cooperative behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7(4), 349–
361.  
Tyler, T. R., & Degoey, P. (1995). Collective restraint in social dilemmas: Procedural justice and 
social identification effects on support for authorities. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 69(3), 482-497. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.69.3.482 
JUSTICE, TAXPAYERS’ IDENTITY, AND TAX COMPLIANCE   46 
 
Uhlmann, E. L., Heaphy, E., Ashford, S. J., Zhu, L., & Sanchez-Burks, J. (2013). Acting 
professional: An exploration of culturally bounded norms against nonwork role 
referencing. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 34(6), 866–886. doi: 10.1002/job.1874 
van den Bos, K., Vermunt, & Wilke. (1996). The consistency rule and the voice effect: The 
influence of expectations on procedural fairness judgments and performance. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 26(3), 411-428.  
van den Bos, K., Wilke, H. A. M., & Lind, E. A. (1998). When do we need procedural fairness? 
The role of trust in authority. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(6), 1449-
1458. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.75.6.1449 
van Dijk, E., De Cremer, D., & Handgraaf, M. J. J. (2004). Social value orientations and the 
strategic use of fairness in ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 40(6), 697-707. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2004.03.002 
van Dijk, E., Parks, C. D., & van Lange, P. A. M. (2013). Social dilemmas: The challenge of 
human cooperation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 120(2), 
123-124. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.12.005 
van Dijke, M., & De Cremer, D. (2008). How leader prototypicality affects followers' status: The 
role of procedural fairness. European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 
17(2), 226-250. doi: 10.1080/13594320701743491 
van Dijke, M., & De Cremer, D. (2010). Procedural fairness and endorsement of prototypical 
leaders: Leader benevolence or follower control? Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 46(1), 85-96. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.10.004 
JUSTICE, TAXPAYERS’ IDENTITY, AND TAX COMPLIANCE   47 
 
van Dijke, M., & Verboon, P. (2010). Trust in authorities as a boundary condition to procedural 
fairness effects on tax compliance. Journal of Economic Psychology, 31(1), 80-91. doi: 
10.1016/j.joep.2009.10.005 
van Houwelingen, G., van Dijke, M., & De Cremer, D. (2014). Fairness enactment as response to 
higher level unfairness: The roles of self-construal and spatial distance. Journal of 
Management, 20(10), 1–29. doi: 10.1177/0149206314530166 
van Lange, P. A. M. (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in outcomes: An 
integrative model of social value orientation. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 77(2), 337-349.  
Vancouver, J. B., & Carlson, B. W. (2015). All things in moderation, including tests of 
mediation (at least some of the time). Organizational Research Methods, 18(1), 70-91. 
doi: 10.1177/1094428114553059 
Walker, H. A. (1989). The social psychology of procedural justice. American Journal of 
Sociology, 95(1), 250-252. doi: 10.2307/2780447 
Weiner, B., Graham, S., & Reyna, C. (1997). An attributional examination of retributive versus 
utilitarian philosophies of punishment. Social Justice Research, 10(4), 431-452. doi: 
10.1007/bf02683293 
Wenzel, M. (2002). The impact of outcome orientation and justice concerns on tax compliance: 
The role of taxpayers' identity. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(4), 629–645. doi: 
10.1037//0021-9010.87.4.629 
Wenzel, M. (2006). A letter from the tax office: Compliance effects of informational and 
interpersonal justice. Social Justice Research, 19(3), 345-364. doi: 10.1007/s11211-006-
0011-y 
JUSTICE, TAXPAYERS’ IDENTITY, AND TAX COMPLIANCE   48 
 
Wenzel, M. (2007). The multiplicity of taxpayer identities and their implications for tax ethics. 
Law and Policy, 29(1), 1-20.  
Wenzel, M., & Jobling, P. (2006). Legitimacy of regulatory authorities as a function of inclusive 
identification and power over ingroups and outgroups. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 36(2), 239–258. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.298 
Worsham, R. G., Jr. (1996). The effect of tax authority behavior on taxpayer compliance: A 
procedural justice approach. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 18(2), 19-39.  
Yang, J., Mossholder, K. W., & Peng, T. K. (2009). Supervisory procedural justice effects: The 
mediating roles of cognitive and affective trust. The Leadership Quarterly, 20(2), 143-
154. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2009.01.009 
Yesegat, W. A., & Fjeldstad, O.-H. (2016). Business people’s views of paying taxes in Ethiopia. 
ICTD Working Paper No. 43. Brighton, UK: The International Centre for Tax and 
Development at the Institute of Development Studies.  
 
